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Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals and since fourteen (14) days have not passed since the
entry of this court's Decision on February 10, 1988, Appellant
Okland Ltd., Inc., hereby petitions the Utah Court of Appeals
for a rehearing in the above entitled matter.

A copy of this

Court's February 10, 1988, Decision is attached hereto and
incorporated by reference as Petitioner's Exhibit "A".
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT'S FEBRUARY 10, 1988, DECISION IS ERROR IN THAT THE
ISSUE OF WHETHER THE AGREEMENT IS VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE AS
A PENALTY OR OTHERWISE CONTAINED UNCONSCIONABLE LIQUIDATED
DAMAGES PROVISIONS WAS IN FACT BEFORE THE LOWER COURT IN
APPELLANT'S MAY 15, 1985, OPPOSING MEMORANDUM. THE LOWER
COURT AND THIS COURT HAVE THUS FAILED TO ADDRESS THIS
ISSUE PROPERLY BEFORE BOTH COURTS.
Page 6 of this Court's February 10, 1988, Decision under
the heading "Alternative Remedy" states that whether the
agreement was void as a matter of law and unenforceable as a
penalty was not raised before the trial court and cannot be considered for the first time on appeal.

(See Exhibit "A" hereto.)

In point of fact this issue was indeed raised in the lower court
in Appellant/Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment, dated May 15, 1985, a copy of which
is attached hereto and incorporated by reference as Petitioner's

-1-

Exhibit "B" and which is part of the lower court's record.
Under the heading therein entitled "Genuine Issues of Fact for
Trial Precluding Summary Judgment for Plaintiff", page 6,
Appellant/Defendant stated the following as an issue of fact:

"Whether the provision in the purported 'lease'
agreement providing that upon a default, lessees are liable
for the balance of the 'lease' payments is a reasonable or
unconscionable liquidated damages clause." [Emphasis added.]
It is clear that the issue of whether the agreement was
unenforceable as a penalty and contained unreasonable liquidated
damages provisions providing for an unconscionable acceleration
of the balance, was in fact before the trial court.

While not

having been addressed by the trial court, such issue was further
not addressed by the Utah Court of Appeals in its February 10,
1988, Decision.

Such is error, particularly when according to

Appellant's Brief, Respondent First Security Financial may have
actual damages of merely $1,800 and Appellant Okland may now be
subject to damages and penalties, including acceleration and
interest, of nearly $50,000.00, or approximately 28 times
Plaintiff/Respondent's actual damages.

This includes the trial

court's erroneous award of unaccrued interest on "lease"
payments that were not yet due and owing, as approximately 2 ^
years remained on the purported 5-year "lease" at the time of

-2-

the alleged default.

Such an overall accelerated award and

windfall to First Security Financial is unconscionable and a
burlesque upon justice particularly when First Security neither
proved nor calculated its damages nor demonstrated any evidence
of how it indeed calculated or was able to calculate such, particularly when it was an alleged assignee of the agreement and
had few records or documents in its files which it received from
Murray First Thrift, its purported assignor.

(See Point 2 of

Appellant's Brief, on file herein, pages 29-35 and cases cited
therein.)
POINT II
APPELLANT IN FACT ASSERTED DEFENSES UNDER ARTICLE 9 IN
ITS AMENDED ANSWER IN THE LOWER COURT AND THEREFORE THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN BASING ITS FEBRUARY 10 DECISION
ON APPELLANT'S ALLEGED FAILURE TO DO SO.
The first full paragraph of page 6 of the Court of Appeals
February 10, 1988, Decision states:
"Furthermore, Okland has not asserted any specific
defenses or counterclaims as a debtor under Article 9.
Given that failure it makes no difference if the contract
at issue is either a lease or a sales agreement." [See
Exhibit "A" hereto.]
On the contrary, Appellant Okland stated as an affirmative
defense in its Amended Answer dated September 9, 1985, on file
with the trial court, paragraph 12, page 3 therein, that
"Plaintiff's claims were barred by the fact that the agreement
between the parties involves a security interest governed by
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Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code."

[See A.9; R.191 of

Appellant's Brief incorporated herein by reference.]

For this

reason the Court's decision is in error as Okland clearly and in
fact asserted Article 9 defenses and such was unequivocally
before this and the lower court.
POINT III
THE FEBRUARY 10 DECISION OF THIS COURT IS IMPOSSIBLE
TO RECONCILE WITH THE UTAH SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN
COLONIAL LEASING COMPANY OF NEW ENGLAND, INC. v. LARSON
BROS. CONST. CO., 731 P.2d 483, (Utah 1986) AS CLEARLY
CONTEMPLATED IN UTAH SUPREME COURT RULE 43(2). (A
copy of the Colonial Decision is attached hereto and
incorporated by reference as Petitioner's Exhibit WC".)
Just because the equipment in this case was not repossessed
by the secured party nor that it made any attempt to mitigate
its damages, by even trying to locate the equipment, it does not
follow that whether the agreement was a "lease", security
agreement, installment, or collateral sales contract is not an
issue of fact.

Repossession of collateral itself is irrelevant

and was irrelevant in Colonial Leasing as Justice Stewart stated
therein:

"The basic legal issue at stake here is whether the

transaction was a lease or sale of the equipment."

Justice

Stewart, in reversing Judge Billings in Colonial, stated:
"In granting Colonial's Motion for Summary Judgment,
the trial court ruled that the parol evidence of an option
to buy was inadmissible, apparently because of the parol
evidence rule and the statute of frauds." [Emphasis
added.] Colonial, 49 Ut. Adv. Rpts. at 5.
In the case at bar, Okland's Opposing Affidavit attests to
an oral option to buy including other oral uderstandings as evi-4-

denced in the record.

This issue and its effect was not dealt

with in the court's February 10 Decision.

Justice Stewart went

on to say in Colonial, 49 Ut. Adv. Rpts. at 7 the following:
"Many of these factors [those intended to make it a
security agreement] are present in this lease. Under the
lease Larson was to select the equipment and choose what
supplier Colonial would obtain it from. All warranties by
Colonial were excluded. Larson was required to insure the
crawler-loader in favor of Colonial and to pay all taxes.
He also bore the risk of loss. The lease concerned
default provisions governing acceleration and resale.
The trial judge in this case did not address what these
provisions indicated as to the intent of the parties or
whether the terms were ambiguous, therefore necessitating
the admission of parol evidence to ascertain the intent of
the parties. [Emphasis added.]
"....In any event, the agreement in this case, for an
oral option, if any, is not inconsistent with the express
terms of the agreement. Although no such admission has
been made in the present case, appellant has alleged an
oral option consistent with industry custom and trade in
the affidavits, and that is sufficent to create an issue of
fact. [Emphasis added.]
"Only when contract terms are complete, clear, and
unambiguous can they be interpreted by the judge on a
motion for summary judgment. Morris v. Mountain States
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 658 P.2d 1199, 1201 (Utah 1983).
If the evidence as to the terms of an agreement is in
conflict, the intent of the parties as to terms of the
agreement is to be determined by a jury. Id*; Amjacs
Interwest, Inc. v. Design Associates, 635 P.2d 53, 55 (Utah
1981). In sum, whether a lease was intended as security
for a sale is a question to be determined on the facts of
each case, as is the issue or whether the nature of the
document raises questions of fact that preclude summary
judgment.* FMA Financial Corp., 590 P.2d at 805."
[Emphasis added.]
The terms of the "lease" agreement in Colonial are identical to the "lease" in the case at bar.
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(See Exhibit "C"

hereto. ) The trial court in this case ruled as a matter of law
that it made no difference what the agreement or intention of
the parties was as to the agreement regardless of the oral
option to purchase consistant with industry trade and custom and
Okland's opposing affidavits, and in fact ruled/ without any
evidence, that the equipment was "lost".
in derogation of Colonial.
Brief.]

This is patent error

[See A.37; R.371 of Appellant's

The trial court further refused to allow any parol evi-

dence as to what the agreement between the parties was and its
purpose, including but not limited to the effect of the oral
option to purchase.

Such includes the tax ramifications and who

was to receive the various benefits.

In paragraphs 16 and 17 of

James G. Okland's Opposing Affidavit of record in the lower
court [A. 26; R.

205 of Appellant's Brief], Mr. Okland attests

to the existence of several oral understandings that were purposely not in the written agreement.

Therein Mr. Okland states:

"16. In addition, there were oral understandings as to the
'residual' on the Lease which are not contained in the
lease, namely who would own the equipment upon expiration
of the lease terms and conditions and what the unstated
'residual' was or would be and upon what such was based.
"17. Finally, the written lease does not contain several
oral understandings as to investment tax credits, depreciation, and other tax considerations and were purposely
not put in the 'lease', including the 'residual', as it was
my understanding that if these terms were written into the
lease it would not be a 'lease' but another instrument
more like a collateral sales agreement or security agreement
which would more accurately reflect the understanding of
the parties hereto." [See A.26; R. 205 of Appellant's Brief.]
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This court's February 10, Decision is totally irreconcilable with Colonial Leasing, supra, and stands for the erroneous proposition that a secured party would be stupid at best
to tailor an agreement as anything but a "lease" and ever
repossess its collateral or attempt to mitigate its damages
under any circumstances.

In this case, First Security made no

attempt to mitigate its damages when it had been paid on the
"lease" 21/2 years, long after Okland ceased having any involvement in the project, when Okland had never made any payments,
and Murray First Thrift and First Security knew such.

At the

time of default First Security and only First Security knew
where the equipment was as it and only it knew who had been
paying it.

The Utah Supreme Court in Colonial stated clearly

that a dispute as to what the agreement between the parties is
and an oral option to purchase, both existent in this case,
creates an issue of fact precluding summary judgment.

Further

Justice Stewart stated that parol evidence is admissible in all
such circumstances as a matter of law to ascertain such.
the trial failed to do, exactly as in Colonial.

This,

(Again,

reference is made to Exhibit "C" hereto.)
POINT IV
THIS COURT HAS NOT REVIEWED THE RECORD AND THE LOWER
COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT "IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE"
TO APPELLANT, THE PARTY AGAINST WHOM THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
WAS GRANTED.
On page 3 of this court's February 10, 1988, Decision, this
court has purported to "review the facts and inferences in a
-7-

light most favorable to the losing party, and determine if the
undisputed facts before the court establish First Security's
right to judgment as a matter of law."

Citing Atlas Corp. v,

Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 255, 229 (Utah 1987).

On the

contrary the court has proceeded to "believe" First Security
Financial's presentation of the "facts" and ignored the fact
that the nature of the agreement and intent of the parties was
never determined by the lower court, and that Okland had an
oral option to purchase, all flying in the face of Colonial
Leasing, supra.

To be sure, Plaintiff First Security never

proved its case or its damages with any competent evidence or
even that it was the lawful assignee of the "lease", let alone
that it mitigated its damages.

In this regard, Judge Greenwood

in Tripp v. Vaughn, 71 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (December 2, 1987)
recently ruled that a bank executive vice president's testimony
regarding damages on a note was inadmissible hearsay.

The same

holds true for the affidavits of Messrs. Russell and Cummings
submitted by Plaintiff in Support of First Security Financial's
Motion for Summary Judgment in the lower court.

This Court has

a duty to review such self-serving affidavits and the record in
"a light most favorable" to Defendant/Appellant Okland which it
has abjectly failed to do.
It is well settled in Utah that a summary judgment should
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be granted only when it is clear from undisputed facts that the
opposing party cannot prevail.
P.2d 387 389 (Utah 1984).

Frisbee v. K & K Const. Co., 676

Again this includes reviewing facts

and inferences in a light "most favorable" to the party against
whom the summary judgment was granted.
P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1977).

Durham v. Magretts, 571

Appellant contends that this court

clearly failed to do so as a matter of law in rendering its
February 10, 1988, Decision.
Ass'n. v.

Rule 56(e); Utah Farm Prod. Credit

Wasatch Bank, 734 P.2d 904, 905 (Utah 1987).
POINT V

REASONABLE MINDS WOULD DIFFER ON PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL'S SELF-SERVING AND HEARSAY
CALCULATION OF ITS DAMAGES. BECAUSE SUCH IS NOT FOR A SUM
CERTAIN (OF CALCULATION) A TRIAL OR EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON
THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES IS REQUIRED.
Appellant has submitted that the damages unilaterally
calculated by Respondent are not for a sum certain and therefore
a trial or evidentiary hearing on the issue of damages is
required.

In Russell v. Martel, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984), the

Utah Supreme Court held that plaintiff's claims were not for a
sum certain and therefore a hearing should have been conducted
by the trial court to ascertain the amount of damages to which
the plaintiffs are entitled.

The court held that the trial

court is not at liberty to deviate from such rules.
WHEREFORE, Appellant prays for this court's vacating of its
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February 10 Decision, and for reversal and remand of the trial
court's decision.

Appellant hereby further requests pursuant to

Rule 35 for a written answer to this Petition so that it may be
apprised of the commencement of its 30-day time period/ if
necessary, for petitioning the Supreme Court for a Writ of
Certiorari pursuant to Utah Supreme Court Rule 43(2).
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of February, 1988.

John/Michael Coombs
CERTIFICATION OF GOOD FAITH
In accordance with Rule 35, the undersigned as counsel to
Appellant Okland Ltd., Inc., hereby certifies on his oath that
this Petition is presented in good faith and not for delay or
any other wrongful or unethical purpose or motive but based on a
belief that this Court has egregiously erred in its February 10,
1988 Decision.
DATED this

day of February, 1988.

Johry Michael Coombs
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this

day of

February, 1988.

Notary Public
Residing at Salt Lake City, UT
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My Commission Expires:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

day of February, 1988,

I delivered four (4) copies of the foregoing Petition, Request for
Answer, and Certification to Kyle W. Jones, Esq., Attorney for
Respondent, 200 South Main, Suite 1000, Salt Lake City, Utah
84101 and Leonard W.

Burningham, Esq., Co-Counsel to Petitioner/

Appellant, 47 West 200 South, Suite 460, Salt Lake City, Utah
84101.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
—-—00O60
First Security Financial/
a Utah corporation/
Plaintiff and Respondent/

OPINION
(For Publication)

v.
Okland Ltd.# Inc.,
and
Bradshaw-Ferrin Development
Company/ now known as
Bradshaw Development Co./
a Utah corporation/

Cas^ No. 860314-CA

Defendants and Appellant,

FILED

v.
Doug Bradshaw, Robert M.
Simonsen, City Gate
Condominium Partnership,
a limited partnership/ and
John Does 1-5,

FEB 1 0 1988
Timoihy;... Shea
Clark of ihe Court
Ut£h Court c? Appeals

Third-Party Defendants
and Respondents.
Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson and Orme.

GREENWOOD, Judge:
Defendant Okland Ltd./ Inc. (Okland) appeals from a summary
judgment granted plaintiff/ First Security Financial (First
Security)/ for Okland's breach of an equipment lease
agreement. Okland claims on appeal that the trial court erred
in granting the motion for summary judgment because geniune
issues of material fact existed/ or, alternatively, the lease
should be declared void as a penalty and the judgment reversed.
On September 31, 1981/ Okland and Bradshaw-Ferrin
Development Co. (BFDC) executed an equipment lease agreement as
lessees/ agreeing to pay certain sums to Murray First Thrift
(MFT)/ lessor/ for lease of personal property. MFT
simultaneously purchased the property described in the lease
a

EXHIBIT

A

agreement from Okland and BFDC, as evidenced by a check and
bill of sale. The lease provided for a term of sixty months,
with monthly payments of $775.19. The lessees paid $1,550.38,
representing first and last months' rent, on execution of the
lease agreement.
After the lessees had missed several payments under the
lease agreement, First Security filed suit against Okland and
BFDC on May 16, 1984, alleging that First Security was the
successor in interest to MFT on the lease agreement, that the
lease was in default, and that ib, should be granted judgment
for amounts due under the lease and return of the equipment
leased. Okland1s answer generally denied it had sufficient
information to admit or deny the complaint's allegations. The
answer further stated that Okland had acted in good faith in
regard to the lease agreement and that First Security had
failed to mitigate its damages. Okland also cross-claimed
against Doug Bradshaw, a principal of BFDC, alleging that
Okland had withdrawn from the project in which the leased
equipment was to be used, that Doug Bradshaw had orally
represented that Okland would not need to seek to be released
by MFT from obligation on the lease agreement, and that Doug
Bradshaw would hold Okland harmless from payment on the lease.
First Security filed a motion for summary judgment against
Okland and BFDC in April 1985, supported by an affidavit of
attorney fees and an affidavit of a First Security officer,
stating the amounts owed under the lease and that the lease
attached to the complaint was identical to the one in First
Security's files. Okland opposed the motion and filed an
affidavit of Okland's counsel, stating that First Security's
counsel had said that the lease was a "sale lease-back" and not
a true lease. Okland also filed an affidavit of James Okland,
president of Okland, stating that he could not obtain
information to verify the accuracy of First Security's
affidavits. Okland also sought additional time to conduct
discovery. On May 17, 1985, the trial court granted First
Security summary judgment against BFDC, which did not appear
nor otherwise oppose the motion, and continued the hearing on
the motion against Okland.
In September 1985, First Security filed another affidavit
executed by a First Security officer, asserting that the
allegations of the complaint were true and setting forth
various amounts owed under the lease agreement totalling
$31,993.23. Okland filed an amended affidavit of James Okland
stating that the lease did not reflect the parties' agreement
and that First Security had not attempted to mitigate its
damages by selling the leased property. Okland also filed a
memorandum which claimed that material issues of fact existed
860314-CA
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precluding granting of summary judgement. Those issues were:
(1) whether the lease was a security agreement; and (2) the
unavailability of documentation regarding the purchase price of
the equipment. Okland also sought leave to amend its answer to
the complaint.
On September 9, 1985, the court granted Okland's motion to
amend its answer. The amended answer alleged as affirmative
defenses that plaintiff's claim was barred by failure of
consideration and by the fact that the lease agreement was
really a security agreement. On September 23, 1985, the court
granted First Security's motion for summary judgment against
Okland for $33,893.23 and found that there were no factual
issues regarding whether the contract was a lease, security
agreement or contract of guarantee and no evidence that First
Security had failed to mitigate damages.
ISUMMARY JUDGMENT
We first consider whether the trial court correctly granted
First Security's motion for summary judgment against Okland.
We will review the facts and inferences in the light most
favorable to the losing party, and determine if the undisputed
facts before the court establish First Security's right to
judgment as a matter of law. Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank,
737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987).
Okland claims that there are two factual disputes
precluding summary judgment: (1) the damages recoverable under
the lease agreement; and (2) whether the lease agreement was
actually a security agreement.
A.
We first address the question of damages recoverable under
the agreement. First Security filed an affidavit in support of
its motion for summary judgment signed by an officer of First
Security. The affidavit states that the affiant is an officer
of First Security and that he has access to its files and has
personal knowledge of the matters set forth in the affidavit.
The affidavit further avers that the equipment listed in the
lease agreement was delivered to defendants and had not been
repossessed by First Security. The affidavit concludes by
itemizing amounts due under the lease for monthly payments,
1984 and 1985 property taxes, late charges and interest accrued
as of the date of the affidavit. A later affidavit of counsel
set forth attorney fees sought by First Security.

860314-CA
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An amended affidavit of James Okland, in opposition to the
motion for summary judgment, states that, "to my knowledge,"
the first payment under the lease, which included the last
month's rent, was not applied to reduce the balance owing under
the lease. In addition, the affidavit claims that the affiant
never received an accounting of application of payments made
and that affiant "believe[s]H that the amount prayed for in the
complaint is erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) requires that
affidavits in opposition to a motion for summary judgment
"shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the
matters stated therein." See also Utah Farm Prod. Credit
Ass'n. v. Watts. 737 P.2d 154, 157 (Utah 1987). Mr. Okland's
affidavit fails to comply with the rule's requirements. His
belief that facts asserted by the opposition are erroneous is
not enough to defeat a motion for summary judgment. In
resisting a motion for summary judgment, "bare contentions,
unsupported by any specifications of facts in support thereof,
raise no material questions of fact." Briqham Truck &
Implement Co. v. Fridal, 71 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 11 (1987) (per
curiam). The affidavit does not contain facts which would be
admissible in evidence controverting First Security's affidavit
as to amounts owed, but only the unsupported contention that
First Security's calculations are*erroneous.
We have also examined the lease agreement itself to
determine if the damages included in the summary judgment were
proper as a matter of law. We conclude that the lease
agreement provides for each category of damages awarded.
Okland claims that it was error for the court to award
prejudgment interest on the unpaid balance of payments due
under the lease. Okland misconstrues the interest award. The
lease provides that upon default the lessor can accelerate
payment and recover interest from the date of acceleration on
the total amount outstanding. Therefore, the interest is not
prejudgment interest but interest expressly payable under the
terms of the contract. Okland also claims the late payment
award was erroneous. However, the late charge is assessed upon
the accelerated balance due under the contract, in accord with
the terms of the contract, and is, therefore, recoverable in an
action under the contract.
B.
Okland's second contention is that an issue of fact existed
regarding whether the agreement is a true lease or a security
agreement, precluding summary judgment. James Okland's
affidavit stated that the actual agreement among MFT, Okland
and BFDC, was for a "sale lease-back," with an option to
860314-CA
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purchase the property for a nominal sum at the end of the lease
term, Okland's memorandum in opposition to the motion for
summary judgment includes portions of a deposition of a former
employee of MFT, which supports the assertion that the
transaction was really intended as a secured sale# not a true
lease. Okland cites Colonial Leasing Co. of New England, Inc.
v. Larsen Bros. Constr., 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), as
controlling precedent. In Colonial Leasing, the trial court
excluded parol evidence offered to prove that an ostensible
lease agreement was actually intended to be a sales and
security agreement subject to the provisions of Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code. The Utah Supreme Court reversed
and remanded, stating that "whether a lease was intended as
security for a sale is a question to be determined on the facts
of each case, as is the issue of whether the nature of the
document raises questions of fact that preclude summary
judgment." Id. at 488. Okland argues, therefore, that this
case should be reversed and remanded for a factual
determination of whether a security agreement was intended by
the parties. However, the purpose of such a factual
determination must be examined. In FMA Financial Corp. v.
Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court
upheld a trial court's determination that a lease of personal
property was actually a secured sale and, therefore, subject to
the provisions of Article 9. The Court further found that
plaintiff in that case had failed to properly comply with the
default provisions of Article 9 and denied it a deficiency
judgment. Plaintiff's breach consisted of a failure to dispose
of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner.
In this case, the putative secured party, First Security,
did not repossess the -collateral*" prior to filing suit nor at
any time during the proceedings before us. Furthermore, a
secured party is not. required by Article 9 to liquidate
collateral prior to pursuing other remedies. Utah Code Ann.
§ 70A-9-501 (1980) provides that a secured party's rights upon
default are alternative. A secured party "has an option to
pursue any of the parties liable on [a] note, which is secured
solely by personal property, and may also, at its option,
ignore that security and satisfy its judgment from other
property in the hands of the judgment debtor." Kennedy v. Bank
of Ephraim, 594 P.2d 881, 884 (Utah 1979). Therefore, First
Security was within its rights, even as a secured creditor, in
not repossessing and selling the "collateral," and then
applying those proceeds to the debt. The cases cited by Okland
all involve failure of a secured creditor to properly care for
or dispose of collateral. However, the duties of a secured
creditor to protect and properly sell collateral do not arise
until the secured party has exercised its right to repossess
the collateral. North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Sharpe, 35 N.C.
860314-CA
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App. 404, 241 S.E.2d 360, 361 (1978). Since First Security did
not repossess the equipment, it had no Article 9 duties
regarding the equipment even if Article 9 applied. See Themy
v. Seagull Enters., Inc.. 595 P.2d 526, 529 (Utah 1979)
(summary judgment appropriate, even if facts in dispute,
M
where, even according to the facts as contended by the losing
party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law-).
Furthermore, Okland has not asserted any specific defenses
or counterclaims as a debtor under Article 9. Given that
failure, it makes no difference if the contract at issue is
viewed as a lease agreement or a sales agreement. The monthly
payments required are either lease payments or installment
sales payments. However denominated, monthly payments and any
other damages designated in the contract as payable upon
default, are recoverable as a basic matter of contract law in
this case. Okland may not prevail on a defense theory which
has not been pled or even articulated at any point in the
proceedings. This Court has previously held, in affirming a
summary judgment, that H a judgment order must not only be
supported by competent evidence, but the pleadings must allege
applicable legal theories." Hendricks v. Interstate Homes.
Inc., 745 P.2d 475, 477 (Utah App. 1987).
Therefore, we find that the trial court correctly granted
First Security summary judgment against Okland.
II
ALTERNATIVE REMEDY
Okland maintains, alternatively, that even if otherwise
appropriate, the trial court's judgment should be reversed and
judgment entered in its favor, with this Court finding that the
agreement is void as a matter of law and unenforceable as a
penalty. We need not examine this argument as it was not
raised before the trial court and cannot be considered for the
first time on appeal. Travner v> Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 857
(Utah 1984); James v. Preston, <746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App.
1987).
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The trial court's judgment is. affirmed.
to First Security.

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

WE CONCURL

Gregory KT Orme, Judge

Norman H. Jackson, Judge

860314-CA

7

Costs are awarded
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CYU'T'T

oooOooo
Co-Defendant/Third-Plaintiff Okland Ltd. Inc., by and
through its attorneys of record John Michael Coombs and E. Paul
Wood respectfully submits this Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment set for hearinq on
Friday, May 17, 1985, at the hour of 10:00 o'clock a.m. on the
Law and Motion calendar of the Honorable Judith M. Billinqs and
attaches hereto and incorporates by reference the affidavit of
Okland Ltd., Inc.
FACTS
On September 30, 1981, Defendants executed a purported
"equipment lease" with Murray First Thrift Leasinq, the
apparent predecessor in interest to Plaintiff herein, the terms
of which required payments on the part of Defendant lessees of
$775.19 per month for a tdtal of 60 months or five years for
total payment of $46,511.40 as the purported value of the
"lease".

At the time of enterinq the "lease" agreement it was

Co-defendant/Thipd Party Plaintiff Okland Ltd.'s understanding
that upon expiration of the "lease" and payment of all monthly
"rentals'1 due and owinq under the agreement, that
Defendant/Co-lessees would in fact own the equipment and retain
title thereto or title would be transferred free and clear to
them upon payment of a nominal residual fee.

(See Affidavit of

Okland Ltd., Inc. in support of this Memorandum.)
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The purpose of Defendant/lessee1s entering the purported
w

lease" agreement was to provide model furniture for the pro-

posed model condominium at the Whilshire Condonimum project subsequently built and located on 4th South and 10th East in Salt
Lake City.

It was anticipated that Okland Ltd. Inc., in conjunc-

tion with its construction company, would, in fact, construct The
Wilshire, but soon after entering the "lease" agreement,
Oklands, without prejudice to any party, removed themselves from
participation in the venture.

Okland Ltd. made no payments on

the subject "lease" nor did they ever subsequently participate
in the construction of The Wilshire.

Co-defendant

Bradshaw-Ferrin Development, now known as Bradshaw Development
Company, and Third-Party Defendants Douglas C. Bradshaw, Bob
Simonson, and City Gate Condominium Partnership apparently made
all "lease" payments pursuant to the aqreement until the early
part of 1984.

Okland Ltd. Inc.

purported "lease" and James G.

received no benefit from the
Okland was orally informed by

Third-Party Defendant Douglas C.

Bradshaw, principal of co-

defendant/lessee Bradshaw Development Company, that Okland Ltd.
Inc. would essentially be indemnified from any liability on the
subject "lease".

(See Cross-Claim and Third Party Complaint on

file herein and Affidavit of Okland Ltd. Inc. attached hereto
and incorporated by reference.)
Murray First Thrift Leasing, the apparent predecessor in
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interest to Plaintiff, filed a UCC 1 Financing Statement with
the State of Utah perfecting its security interest in the purported equipment subject to the "lease".

It is noteworthy that

the equipment subject hereto is not identified by either serial
or model number and further there is no evidence that an
acknowledgment of receipt of delivery of the property exists nor
do copies of the invoices evidencing the actual purchase price
of the equipment seem to be available.

Copies of the financing

statement documents filed by Plaintiff's predecessor, Murray
First Thrift Leasing, are attached hereto and incorporated by
reference as Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff Okland's Exhibits
"A", "B" and "C".

That copied of the original purchase price

invoices and any acknowledgments of receipt of delivery of the
specific equipment unidentified by serial or model number in the
financinq statements do not exist or are u/iavailable are evidenced by the affidavit of John Michael Toombs attached hereto
and further incorporated by reference.
Based on the apparent default of co-lessees and third-party
defendants, Plaintiff filed this action on May 16, 1984, and has
failed to pursue the matter or conduct any discovery until the
filing of its Motion for Summary Judgment one year later in
which Plaintiff asks for 18% interest per annum on the balance
of the "lease" from the date of Defendants' alleged default.
Since having been given notice of Plaintiff's Motion for

-4-

nummary Judgment in April, Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff,
Okland Ltd. Inc. has submitted to Plaintiff, Co-defendant, and
Third Party Defendants various Reguests for Production of Documents, Reguests for Admission and Interrogatories and has
further filed a Notice of Deposition of former Vice President of
Murray First Thrift Leasing Robert M. Barr and has further submitted a Second Set of Interrogatories and Reguest for
Production of Documents to Plaintiff as to other "leasing"
agreements entered into by Murray First Thrift Leasing,
demonstrating the intent of the parties and course of conduct of
Plaintiff with regard to any such other "leases."
It is Okland Ltd. Inc.'s understanding that the "lease"
agreement was not a "lease" but a "security agreement" as
defined and contemplated in 70A-1-207(37) of the Utah Uniform
Commercial Code, and that the agreement, though purporting on
its face to be a "lease" is in fact a "security agreement"
governed by Articles 9 and 2 of Utah Uniform Commercial Code,
and furthermore that Plaintiff has failed to mitigate its damages, among other things, by failing to repossess the eguipment
and take no action on the lawsuit for one year after its
complaint was filed.
GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT FOR TRIAL PRECLUDING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF
Whether it was the intention of the parties at the time of
entering the "lease" agreement and pursuant to any modifications
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of such that the agreement was in fact a "security agreement"
aside from the self-serving declarations in the agreement
itself.
Whether the provision in the purported "lease" agreement
providing that upon default, lessees are liable for the balance
of the "lease" paymentsf is a reasonable or unconscionable
liguidated damages clause.
What the intention of the parties was at the time of
entering the contract as to the useable life of the eguipment,
the beneficiaries of the investment tax credit, who would own
the eguipment upon expiration of the "lease", and on what terms,
what the purchase price of the equipment wais in relation to the
rental payments and whether the total "rental" payments exceed
the perchase value of the eguipment.
Whether the monthly payments under the alleged "lease" have
been calculated to be returned to the leasing company include
the purchase pricef sales tax and interest, etc. and therefore
the agreement under the facts is one for security.
Whether the unavailability or nonexistence of supporting
documentation as to the purchase price of the equipment and
Plaintiff's inabilitly to calculate its "actual" damages precludes summary judgment for Plaintiff.
Whether Okland Ltd., Inc. would be prejudiced by summary
judgment and whether it is in the interests of justice and judi-
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cial economy under the one action rule to set the case for trial
and resolve the respective liabilities amongst all parties
together.
Whether parol evidence is admiasable in thi&, c«#*MJ6rr
demonstrate a waiver by plaintiff of purported "leaae1** eicec**tory provisions.
ARGUMENT
I.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE DENIED AS THERE ARE GENUINE
ISSUES OF FACT AS TO WHETHER THE PURPORTED "LEASE" IS
A SECURITY AGREEMENT GOVERNED BY THE UCC ON THE BASIS
OF THE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES AND THE FACTS TO BE
ADDUCED AT TRIAL.
U.C.A. 1953, as amended, 70A-1-20K37) provides, in per-

tinent part as follows:
"Whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined by the facts of each case; however (a) the inclusion
of an option to purchase does not of itself make the lease
one intended for security and ~-.£b> an a$£$ement«|g|^
compliance with the terms of the lease the leasee";4dwll
become or has the option to b«c«e the owwr of t l ^ m ^
perty for no additional conaid*ll*i'dil'or for nomina^^|nsideration does make the lease one intended for s^c^tttfr.11
(Emphasis added.)
Though the purported "lease" did not include an option to
purchase and contained no provisions that upon compliance with
the terms of the "lease" the lessees would become owners of the
equipment or have the option to become the owners of the property for no additional or nominal consideration, as set forth
in the affidavit of James G. Okland, it was Defendant/Third
Party Pgflintiff, Okland Ltd., Inc.'s understanding that lessees
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would become the owners of the equipment if they

desired for

either no additional consideration or nominal consideration and
therefore, the lease was one intended for security. Arnold
Machinery Co. v. Balls, Utah,

624 P.2d 678, 680 (1981)? I.C.

Bender's Uniform Commercial Code, §29A.05(1)(d).
In FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers, Utah, 590 P.2d 803
(1979) the Supreme Court of Utah ruled t h a t ^ * | f g p | ^
treated as a security interest where only nominal consideration
is necessary to exercise an option to pur*ftase.

In that case

the Court proposed three tests to analyze whether the purchase
option contained in the lease may be deemed a security interest:
(1) compare the option price with the oriqinal list price or
cost price of the property; (2) compare the option price with
"sensible alternatives" and (3) compare the option price to the
fair market value of the property at the time the option is to
be exercised.

Arnold Machinery Company, supra, at 680. In

the case at bar, based on the Affidavit of James G.
Okland, the lessees had the option to become owners of the property for little or no consideration.

Judginq from the record,

there is insufficient evidence to apply the Court's threepronged test in FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers and in
order to apply these tests facts are necessary to be adduced at
trial thereby precludinq summary judgment for Plaintiff.
In the case of Western Enterprises vs. Arctic Office
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Machinery, 667 P.2d 1232 (Alaska 1983) the Court held that
defining when a security interest consistent with the purchase
and sell agreement is created by a purported lease, nominality
of an option price contained in the purported lease is only one
of the indicia of whether the transaction is a lease or purchase
agreement.

The Court further held that finding that the option

price is nominal would conclusively establish that the transaction is a conditional sales agreement, but the fact that the
option price is not nominal does not foreclose construing the
purported lease as a purchase agreement.

Western Enterprises,

supra at 1235•
In Centurian Corporation v. Cripps, 624 P.2d 706, 709, (1981) the
Supreme Court of Utah held that when a transaction purports on
its face to be a lease, but is in fact a sale with reservation
of a security interest in vendor, it becomes subject to law of
sales.

U.C.A. 1953, 70A-1-20K37).

In the case at bar

Plaintiff's predecessor filed UCC-1 financing statements with the
State of Utah evidencing reservation of a security interest in
them.

(See Exhibits HA", "B", and "C" attached hereto.)
In Leasing Service Corp. v. Nat* Bank & Trust Co. (1976, F

DC NJ) 19 UCCRS 252 (applying New Jersey Code), it was held the
degree by which the total rentals exceeded the purchase value
of the eguipment compelled the conclusion that no residual
proprietary rights were contemplated by the lessor at the end of
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the 5-year term and that the leases were intended as security
within the meaninq of S1-20K37) of the UCC.

Most, though not

all of the terms and conditions of the form leases at issue in
the present case support the conclusion that these transactions
were conditional sales, not true leases, the court dclared.

The

absence of an option to purchase did not require a contrary
conclusion, the court said, pointing out that it was possible
that the 5-year term closely approximated the ecoruMi^ IXtm

^ ^

the equipment, although the court conceded that the parties had
presented no data concerning the anticipated useful life of the
leased equpment.

The court also noted other indicia of a con-

ditional sale in the leases, among which were the followinq:
the requirement that the lessee provide insurance aqainst loss,,
theft, damage, or destruction of the leased equipment in an
amount not less than the total rent, the requirement that the
lessee was to bear the entire risk of loss, theft, damaqe or
destruction, and that no such loss would relieve the lessee of
its obligation to pay rent, the requirement that the lessee hold
the lessor harmless from all claims and liabilities arising in
connection with the equipment, the requirement that the lessee pay
all charges and taxes imposed upon the ownership, leasing, renting,
sale, purchase, possessionf or use of the equipment, except
taxes based on the lessor's net income, the requirement that the
lessee pay a substantial deposit ("advance rent") upon accep-

-10-

tance of the leases, the provision for acceleration of rental
payments and the payment of attorney's fees by the lessee in the
event of default, and a provision specifying the supplier of
the equipment to be leased, suggesting that the lessor purchase
this equipment specifically for lease to this lessee.
In O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc» v.

^^^mCWtMt€Btlnc.

91976, NY) 18 UCCRS 1342, it was held that leases of^equipment
were in fact security transactions*within the meaning of §1-201
of the Uniform Commercial Code, the court pointing out that the
total rentals for the lease term approximated the cost of the
equipment plus interest, that the purchase was made by the lessor
in specific response to the lessee9s order'and after the leases
were signed, and were designed for the lessee's use and subject
to model obsolescence and that the equipment would lose the most
substantial portion of its value by the end of the leases.
II.

PAROL EVIDENCE IS ADMISSIBLE TO DEMONSTRATE THE
EXISTENCE OF AN OPTION ON THE LEASED EQUIPMENT AND ITS
EXISTENCE PRECLUDES SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF
In FMA Financial Corporation v. Pro-Printers, supra at 805,

FMA asserted that because the written lease agreement made no
mention of an option to purchase and contained an •'integration
clause" stating that the written lease contained the entire
agreement between the parties, defendant should not be allowed
to vary the written terms with parol evidence of an option to
purchase.

The Court held, however, that "FMA's officers
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admitted at trial that they offered lessees the option to purchase
leased equipment as a matter of course in their business? thus
renderinq the alleqed inteqration clause ineffective," and
therefore parol evidence was admissible,

FMA, supra, at 805,

In

the case at bar not only should trial be had to determine the
intention of the parties, but to afford them the opportunity of
proving that the "lease" was a secured sale and not a "true
lease" .

(Again, see Affid'av/iL of John MiiUdMl Coombs/)

In Lease Finance Inc. v. Burger, 575 P.2d 857 (Colo* 1977),
the Court held that parol evidence was admissible to show waiver
of executory provisions of the sales contract.
supra at 857.

Lease Finance,

In that case the Court further held that whether

a transaction is characterized as a lease or sale is not conclusive, but rather it is the intention of the parties which is
controlling, that intention to be determined by facts of each
case.

Lease Finance, supra at 857.
CONCLUSION
Summary judgment can be qranted only if the record shows

that there is no qenuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judqment as a matter of law.
Doubts, uncertainties or inferences concerning issues of fact
must be construed in a light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment.

Litigants must be able to present

their cases fully to the Court before judgment can be rendered
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against them unless it is obvious from the evidence before the
Court that the party opposing judgment can establish no riqht to
recover.
lity.

The trial court must not weigh evidence or credibi-

Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Atkin,

Wright and Miles, Charted, 681 P.2d 1258, (Sup. Ct. 18633,
04/72/84); Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, (Sup. Ct. 18415
12/13/83).
Based on the above Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Okland
Ltd., Inc. hereby respectfully urges the Court to deny
Plaintiff's Motion for.Summary Judgment.
DATED this / \

""ciay of May, 1985]

J&hrf Ri<fhael Coombs1
i. Paul Wood
Attorneys for Okland Ltd., Inc.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this
//*
*Hay of May, 1985, I
is /£*%k"i
mailed a copy of the foregoing Memorandum to Steven D. Crawley,
Attorney for Bradshaw Development Co., Doug Bradshaw, and City
Gate Condominium Partnership, Suite 107, 2225 East
Murray-Holladay Road, Salt Lake City, Utah

84117; Kyle W.

Jones, Attorney for Plaintiff, 200 South Main, Suite 1000, Salt
Lake City, Utah

84101; and Third-Party Defendant Bob Simonson,

2091 East 4800 South, Salt Lake City Utah
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
COLONIAL LEASING COMPACT0T
NEW ENGLAND, INC., a Mflt*tc*Mtf|r
corporation, dba CokMtiai'Pactfk Latitat
Company,
Plaintiff and Respondeat,
v,
LARSEN BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION
CO., a general partnership; MfctatfsWr
Larsen and Jody Earl Larsen, tsnMNsfc;
Michael Ray Laraen and Jody Earf Lama
Brothers ConstincUaji Company,
Defendants and %f nsHint
No. 193S4
FILED: December 22, 19t*
THIRD DISTIRCT
Hon. Judith M.. Billings •
ATTORNEYS:
Royal K. Hunt for the Defendants and
Appellant
L. Edward Robbins for the Plaintiff and
Respondent
STEWART, Justice:
Plaintiff Colonial Leasing Company tfntnv
ferred possession of a heavy piece of coasts
uction equipment called a crawler-loader to:
defendant Michael Ray Larsen pursuant to i
document called a "lease/ Larsen defaulted
on the payments required by that document
and the plaintiff sued for damages. The trial
court granted Colonial Leasing summary
judgment on its claim for S27.716.I0, the
amount due under the document, less the
proceeds of a sale of the equipment after
plaintiffs repossession, plus costs and attorney fees. On appeal, Larsen argues thai the
document was a security agreement subject to
the filing requirements of Article 9 of till!
Uniform Commercial Code. Since Colonial
failed to comply with Article 9 requiremeflta
in disposing of the collateral, Laraen contends that Colonial was therefore precluded
from recovering a deficiency judgment. In
granting summary judgment, the trial court
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stated in a minute entry: "Affidavits are not
admissible and are barred by statute/ We
reverse and remand for further proceedings.
On September 23, 1977, Larsen obtained
the crawler-loader from Colonial on a 60month "lease." Colonial had purchased the
loader from a supplier specifically for Larsen.
The "lease" contains an integration clause
and expressly requires return of the equipment upon expiration of the lease term. In
May, 1980, Larsen defaulted and the equipment was repossessed and sold for $6,000.
Larsen filed affidavits in opposition to the
motion for summary judgment stating that at
the time the "lease" was entered into, it was
the trade, custom, and usage in the business
to accord lessees an option to purchase leased
equipment at the end of the lease for its residual value and that Colonial had orally
granted Larsen an option to purchase at the
end of the "lease period" for the residual
value of the equipment of approximately 10
percent.
The basic legal issue at stake here is
whether the transaction was a lease or a sale
of the equipment. When a commercial transaction for the acquisition of equipment is in
the form of a lease but in fact is intended to
be a sale, the payments, even though called
"lease payments," are legally considered
installment payments on the purchase price.
At the end of such a "lease," there is either a
nominal payment required to exercise the
option to purchase or a final payment which,
although sizeable in relation to the value of
the goods, leaves the lessee no economic alternative but to exercise the option. .See, e.g.,
In re Vaillancourt, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 748 (Bankr. D. Me. 19^0); In re
Washington Processing Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 475 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1966).
In granting Colonial's motion for summary
judgment, the trial court ruled that parol
evidence of an option to buy was inadmissible, apparently because of the parol evidence
rule and the statute of frauds. On appeal,
Larsen claims that the trial court erred in
ruling that Larsen's affidavits alleging the
existence of an oral option to purchase the
crawler-loader were inadmissible on the
motion for summary judgment. Larsen also
asserts that the terms of the lease itself indicate that the parties really intended a sale and
security arrangement rather than a lease.
I. STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rule^ of Civil
Procedure provides that affidavits in support
of or opposition to a motion for summary
judgment must set forth such facts as would
be admissible in evidence at trial Horton v.
Black ham. 669 P.2d 85^ (Utah 1983). Colo-
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nial claims that the Uniform Commercial
Code, specifically U.C.A., 1953, §70A-2201(1) (1980 ed.), precludes evidence of an
oral agreement between the parties. Section
70A-2-201(l) states:
Except as otherwise provided in this
section a contract for the^sale of
goods for the price of $500 or more is
not enforceable by way of action or
defense unless there is some writing
sufficient to indicate that a contract
for sale has been made between the
parties and signed by the party
against whom enforcement is sought
or by his authorized agent or broker.
Colonial relies on In re Financial Computer
Systems, Inc., 474 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1973),
a case virtually identical to this case, for the
proposition that §70A-2-201(l) bars parol
evidence intended to prove that an apparent
lease transaction is in fact a sale. In that case,
an equipment lessor tried to reclaim from the
lessee's bankruptcy trustee two airconditioning units which it had leased to the lessee.
The trustee refused to turn over the units,
claiming that the lease was in reality a security agreement and void because the lessor
had not filed a financing statement. At the
referee's hearing, the trustee was allowed to
present evidence of an oral option to purchase the equipment at the end of the lease.
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed,
holding that admission of the oral evidence
violated Cal. Comm. Code $2201(1) (West
1964), which is; identical to §70A-2-201(l).
The court, however, failed to consider the
effect of Cal. Comm. Code §2102, which
states that "this division [Article 2 of the
U.C.C] applies to transactions in goods; it
does not apply to any transaction which although in the form of an unconditional contract to sell or [a] present sale is intended to
operate only as a security transaction." Our
code has a virtually identical provision,
§70A-2-102, to the California provision.
Whether the statute of frauds provision
contained in §70A-2-201(i) applies, therefore, is directly dependent on whether this
transaction v/as a lease or an "unconditional
contract to sell or [a] present sale." The trial
court in the instant case did not adjudicate
what the true nature of this transaction was.
Section 70A-2-201(l) is not the only
statute of frauds which might apply to this
case. U.C.A., 1953, §25-5-4 (1984 ed.)
states:
In the following cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum
thereof, is in writing subscribed by
the party to be charged therewith: (1)
every agreement that by its terms is

For complete I (ah Code Annotations, consult Code • Co's Annotatioo Service.
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not to be performed within one year
from the making thereof.
Even if applicable generally to transactions of
the type involved in this case, §25-5-4(1)
does not exclude the oral evidence in this
case. Statutes of frauds are intended to bar
enforcement of certain agreements that the
law requires to be memorialized in writing.
E.g., Howell v. Inland Empire Paper Co., 28
Wash. App. 494, 624 P.2d 739 (1981). But
statutes of fraud do not prevent a party from
proving the true nature of the agreement
between the parties when that is what is at
issue rather than enforceability. Golden v.
Golden, 273 Or. 506, 510, 541 P.2d 1397,
1399 (1975). See also Bennett Leasing Co. v.
Ellison, 15 Utah 2d 72, 387 P.2d 246 (1963).
In accord with that rule, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. v. HutchesonIngram Development Co., 642 F.2d 744 (5th
Cir. 1981), held that oral evidence of an
option was admissible to shed light on the
nature of an agreement between the parties,
and specifically to show that it was a sale. Id.
at 746 n.5. Woods-Tucker also expressly
disavowed the holding in In re Financial
Computer Systems. See also Bennett Leasing
Co., 15 Utah 2d 72, 387 P.2d 246, where this
Court held that even though an unsigned
automobile lease for a term of twenty-four
months was unenforceable, that the underlying oral agreement between the parties was
admissible to show the rental value of the
automobile in an action for quantum meruit.
In this case, the statute of frauds did not
bar Larsen from proving what the parties had
intended, since Larsen sought only to obtain
the protections of Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, not to enforce an unwritten term of the contract. Nor was Colonial's
action for a deficiency judgment on the lease
payments an attempt to enforce the oral
option against Larsen.
II. PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
The Parol Evidence Rule serves to exclude
evidence of terms in addition to those in a
written integrated agreement. "(T]he rule
operates in the absence of fraud to exclude
contemporaneous conversations, statements,
or representations offered for the purpose of
varying or adding to the terms of an integrated contract/ Union Bank v. Swenson, 707
P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985). See also Eie v. St.
Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190, 1194
(Utah 1981); Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz,
28 Utah 2d 261, 266, 501 P.2d 266, 270
(1972); Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53
Yale L.J. 603, 609 (1944). Because the parol
evidence rule applies only if the writing was
intended by the parties to represent the full
and complete agreement of the parties, the

trial court must first determine whether the
writing was intended to be an integrated
agreement. Union Bank, 707 P.2d at 665;
Eie, 638 P.2d at 1194; Bullfrog Marina, 28
Utah 2d at 266, 501 P.2d at 270. In some
cases, it will be necessary for a tria^judge to
rule on the issue of integration as a preliminary or foundational matter. See HaJloranJudge Trust Co. v. Heath, 70 Utah 124, 258
P. 342(1927).
In this case, the trial judge did not expressly rule whether the purported lease was an
integrated writing. Since the affidavits raise a
factual issue as to whether the contract was in
fact intended to be integrated, the trial judge
will need to hear the evidence on that issue.
Indeed, the need for parol evidence is also
suggested by the nature and terms of the lease
itself and the surrounding circumstances.
Larsen also argues that the terms of the
lease itself indicate that it was meant not as a
true lease, but as a security agreement for the
sale of the property. In some cases, such a
judgment may be apparent from the face of
the document, but in other cases, the basic
nature of the agreement, judging solely from
its contents, may be ambiguous. It is the
general rule that if an agreement is ambiguous because of lack of clarity in the meaning
of particular terms, it is subject to parol
evidence as to what the parties intended with
respect to those terms. Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292 (Utah 1983). Set also
Rainier National Bank v. Inland Machinery
Co., 29 Wash. App. 725, 631 P.2d 389
(1981). We hold that that rule also applies
where the character of the written agreement
itself is ambiguous even though its specific
terms are not ambiguous. Bown v. Loveland,
678 P.2d 292, 297 (Utah 1984); W.M. Barnes
Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources Co., 627
P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1981); Hansen v. Kohlcr,
550 P.2d 186, 188-89 (Utah 1976); WoodsTucker Leasing Corp. v. Hutheson-Ingram,
642 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1981).
Numerous factors bear on determining
whether the terms of an agreement show that
it was meant to be a lease or a security agreement. Among others, those factors are
whether (1) the lessor is a financier, (2) the
lessee is required to insure the goods in favor
of the lessor, (3) the lessee bears the risk of
loss or damage, (4) the lessee is to pay the
taxes, repairs, and maintenance, (5) the agreement establishes default provisions governing acceleration and resale, (6) a substantial
nonrefundable deposit is required, (7) the
goods are to be selected from a third party by
the lessee, (8) the rental payments were equivalent to the costs of the goods plus interest,
(9) the lessor lacks facilities to store or retake
the goods, (10) the lease may be discounted
with a bank, (11) the warranties usually
found in leases are omitted, and (12) the
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goods or fixtures are impractical to remove.
J White 8c R. Summers, Handbook of the
Law Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
at 882-83 (2d ed. 1980). To the extent the
above factors are terms of the lease agreement, their probativeness will depend in some »
instances on how they are phrased.
Many of these factors are present in this
lease. Under the lease, Larsen was to select
the equipment and choose what supplier
Colonial would obtain it from. All warranties
by Colonial were excluded. Larsen was required to insure the crawler-loader in favor of
Colonial and to pay all taxes. He also bore
the risk of loss. The lease contained default
provisions governing acceleration and resale.
The trial judge in this case did not address
what these provisions indicated as to the
intent of the parties or whether the terms
were ambiguous, therefore necessitating the
admission of parol evidence to ascertain the
intent of the parties.
Larsen relies heavily on FMA Financial
Corp. v, Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d 803 (Utah
1979), for the proposition that the oral evidence should have been admitted in this case.
FMA recognizes that despite an integration
clause in the form lease involved in that case,
the lease was in fact a sale. At trial, FMA
admitted that it routinely offered lessees an
option to purchase the equipment at the end
of the lease term. The Court held that this
admission rendered the integration clause
ineffective and that the oral evidence was
admissible. In any event, the agreement in
this case, for an oral option, if any, is not
inconsistent with the express terms of the
agreement. Although no such admission has
been made in the present case, appellant has
alleged an oral option consistent with industry custom and trade in the affidavits, and
that is sufficient to create an issue of fact.
Only when contract terms are complete,
clear, and unambiguous can they be interpreted by the judge on a motion for summary
judgment. Morris v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 658 P.2d 1199, 1201
(Utah 1983). If the evidence as to the terms
of an agreement is in conflict, the intent of
the parties as to the terms of the agreement is
to be determined by the jury. Id.; Amjacs
Intentest, Inc. v. Design Associates, 635 P.2d
53, 55 (Utah 1981). In sum, whether a lease
was intended as security for a sale is a question to be determined on the facts of each
case, as is the issue of whether the nature of
the document raises questions of fact that
preclude summary judgment. FMA Financial
Corp.. 590P.2dat805.
Reversed and remanded. Costs to appellant.
WE CONCUR:
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice

Christine M. Durham, Justice
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice
Howe, Justice, concurs in the result.
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